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Societal perceptions and the patriarchal structure dictated by our culture has manifested 
itself though the implementation and interpretations of the laws, which undermine the 
theoretical benefits of khul’. Prior to 2000, women were only allowed to obtain a divorce 
based on limited grounds and the judge’s consent. The ongoing resistance to the khul’ 
law of 2000 highlights the inadequate ability of legal reform to have a transformative 
effect on women’s position in society. This thesis examines the challenges that the khul’ 
law no.1/2000 continues to confront from early opposition to the renewed scrutiny in post 
Mubarak Egypt. The legal and social hurdles put forth by the state as well as rise of 
Islamists and women’s right’s slow advancement in society are examined, highlighting 
that the resistance is based on patriarchal beliefs and societal perceptions of women. This 
paper further examines the role of legal reform in providing revolutionary change in 
Egypt and whether adopting law has, in fact, advanced women’s position in society. Over 
a decade after its enactment, khul’ is still resisted and even threatened in post 
revolutionary Egypt. I argue that the patriarchal beliefs embedded in our society and 
manifested through state imposed barriers and interpretations of the law directly 
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This thesis explores the ongoing resistance that the khul’ law no.1/2000 continues to 
receive in Egypt. From the slow advancement of women's position in society since its 
inception in the late 1990s, to the rise of Islamists in power and increased violence 
against women in the post Mubarak era. The legal and social hurdles put forth by the 
state as well as strategies used by opponents and proponents to further their claims are 
analyzed to highlight the resistance is based on patriarchal beliefs and societal 
perceptions of women. I argue that these patriarchal beliefs embedded in our society and 
manifested through state imposed barriers and interpretations of the law directly 
undermine the purpose of legal reform and the ability of the law to achieve the desired 
change.  
 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first includes this introduction, brief 
background on inequality and women’s aspirations during the January 25th revolution. 
The methodology and theoretical framework for this thesis are also included.  
 
Chapter two provides a historical background on the development of Personal Status 
Laws in Egypt in general, and divorce laws in particular. This is important as it highlights 
the resistance that family law reform received in the past century, as it came to represent 
the last bastion to the Islamic state, which Islamists aimed to preserve through Personal 
Status Laws. The difference between the khul’ law in Islam and the one adopted by 
Egyptian legislatures in 2000 is highlighted and the chapter concludes with the role of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court in family law reform.  
 
Chapter three examines the strategies adopted by reformers to advocate khul’ and the 
resistance and controversy that it faced despite being in the language of Islam. The 
general resistance in government, media and from Islamists is also examined. The chapter 
concludes with the implications of the implementation obstacles that hinder women’s 
access to divorce and undermine the theoretical benefits of khul’.  
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The fourth and final chapter discusses women’s role and position in society in post 
revolutionary Egypt as well as the role of the state and the rise of Islamists to power. The 
increasing violence against women and rejuvenated resistance to khul’ are also examined 
to support the argument that legal reform has been limited in achieving social change and 
advancement of women’s rights in Egyptian society. The paper concludes by arguing that 
the past and present resistance to khul’ is a product of our patriarchal society and 
hierarchy between men and women and not religion per se. Finally, no matter how often 
we change the legal code, the patriarchal order embedded in our society and manifested 
through the state undermines the purpose of legal reform in changing societal perceptions 
and empowering women. 
 
A. Recent Aspirations for Equality 
Growing up in Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s, I witnessed a lot of gender inequality 
around me, from sexual harassment and restrictive societal norms to women’s complete 
exclusion from political life. The gendered roles of male and female, husband and wife 
that our society dictates and the government perpetuates through unequal laws, makes it 
extremely hard to tell whether certain laws or traditions are a product of our culture or 
Islam itself. Male domination and female subordination at the family level as well as on 
the state level are so embedded in the Egyptian culture that they have become the norm. 
Patriarchy is openly practiced in our daily lives and mostly accepted by women as well as 
men. Some women firmly believe that men are stronger, more able beings and happily 
accept this hierarchy that our society has constructed while some simply do not even 
recognize it because they do not know any other way.  
 
After the fall of the Mubarak regime, many women, including myself, believed in a new, 
equal Egypt. We witnessed history unfold before our eyes and hoped for positive change. 
We fantasized about the inclusion of women in all aspects of society, and a new secular, 
constitution that gave women equal rights that were denied to them for years. The slogans 
of the revolution: dignity, social justice and freedom were chanted everywhere by men 
and women regardless of socioeconomic class or religion. Many believed that we would 
achieve those goals for all Egyptians, women and men, Muslims and Copts alike as soon 
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as the revolution was over and Mubarak had fallen. However, in the days after the fall of 
Mubarak, conservatives along with their patriarchal and sexist beliefs replaced women in 
Tahrir Square. Women were slowly shut out, once again, from the socio-political arena. 
Violence against women escalated turning hopes of equality into hopes of survival. The 
first International Woman’s Day after the fall of Mubarak, a number of women, and men, 
went out to protest for gender equality, however, they were quickly outnumbered and 
attacked by conservatives who claimed that a woman’s place was not in Tahrir square but 
rather in the home where they belong.1 And that their demands are against Islam. This 
was a wake up call that quickly reminded us of the reality that the change women fought 
for alongside men, simply excluded women. It was clear that women needed to fight their 
own revolution in order to gain some rights. That no matter how often laws are reformed 
and amended, leaders changed, patriarchy which is too often intertwined and masked by 
Islamic principles, is what must be overcome, especially now with the current unstable 
and ever-changing political situation and an overwhelming Islamist majority in power. 
 
It is a fact that family laws in Egypt have witnessed the least progress and the most 
resistance in the past century.2 Although women made some progress in other aspects of 
society like in education for instance, very little progress has been made in the field of 
family law reform. For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on divorce law reforms, 
particularly law no.1/2000 known as khul’. The government has maintained two entirely 
distinct systems of divorce for men and women.3 While men have unilateral power to 
divorce, women, prior to khul’, had to go through the grueling “notoriously backlogged 
and inefficient courts to divorce their spouses.”4  Reformists’ efforts are too often limited 
because of conservatives’ vehement resistance to personal status law reforms. While they 
succeeded in reforming divorce laws to finally give women the option of initiating a 
divorce, feminist reformers did not go as far as breaking down the patriarchal structure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hadeel AL-Shalchi, Egyptian Women's Rights Protest Marred By Hecklers, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 
8, 2011, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/08/AR2011030803583.html 
2 Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, Promotion of Women’s Rights, Personal Status Laws in Egypt, available 
online at http://genderingermandevelopment.net/files/images/gtz-personal-status-law-in-egypt[1].pdf (last 
visited on April 13, 2013), at 3 
3 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Divorced from Justice: Women's Unequal Access to Divorce in Egypt, 29 (2004), 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/11/30/divorced-justice, last visited on Feb. 23, 2013. 
4 Id, women must still go through the inefficient court systems for a fault-based divorce  
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and societal perceptions of women which significantly impede women’s access to 
divorce. Khul’ did not remedy the hierarchy and gendered roles between husband and 
wife nor did it limit men’s unconditional right to divorce, but rather created an avenue for 




In order to examine the ways in which resistance was expressed to law no. 1/2000, I have 
chosen a qualitative research method that aims to analyze the general opposition to khul’ 
before its adoption, as well as most recently in the post Mubarak era. Furthermore, the 
legal and social obstacles mandated by fundamentalists and implemented by the 
government to restrict the law are also scrutinized in order to test the hypothesis that 
patriarchy embedded in our society always manages to resurface and manipulate the 
outcome of reform. For example, adopting implementation hurdles such as mandatory 
reconciliation to appease Islamists’ opposition to the law. These obstacles have ultimately 
limited the ability of khul’ to substantially advance women’s position in society.  
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C. Theoretical framework 
This thesis offers a descriptive analysis of the resistance towards law no.1/2000 khul’ and 
the limitations of the law’s transformative ability in achieving social change through a 
feminist perspective. I argue that reforming the law without addressing patriarchy from 
which this resistance stems, undermines the theoretical benefits of khul’ and the effects it 
could have on enhancing women’s position in society. I question the purpose of legal 
reform if societal perceptions and government impediments only change the legal code 
but not necessarily the outcome. 
 
The literature on the law as a toll for women’s empowerment suggests that the law has a 
limited ability to provide transformative change because of preconceived societal 
perceptions. Nividita Menon’s arguments regarding these limits is a useful tool for 
understating the challenges that deter the law from achieving its goals. She argues that 
discrimination against women over the years has resulted in an “increasingly critical 
engagement with the legal discourse.”5 When patriarchal practices and values become too 
embedded in society the state and the law become the only reliable power to transform 
society. She discusses the different critiques of feminist theory of the inability of the law 
to achieve social change. She identifies these intertwined engagements as follows: First, 
most legal systems deny women equal rights especially in areas of family law; second, 
even if there is de jure equality, the law still discriminates against women because it is 
interpreted in a patriarchal way; and third, even if the law treats men and women equally, 
the social, cultural and economic hierarchy still discriminates against women, reinforcing 
the belief that it is “unjust to treat unequals equally”.6 Therefore simply giving women 
the same rights as men is not the answer because that will not change the gender 
hierarchy between them. 
 
The constant resort to the law does not necessarily result in satisfactory change, but rather 
as Nandita Haksar notes “is a substitute for the other harder option of building a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 NIVIDETA MENON, RECOVERING SUBVERSION: FEMINIST POLITICS BEYOND THE LAW, 4 
(2004). 
6 Id  
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movement for an alternative vision.” 7 This is particularly apparent in the Egyptian 
context, specifically with personal status law reform. Reformists’ efforts ended in legal 
reform but did not go as far as a social reform movement. The constant reliance on the 
law to give women more rights has not been effective in shifting societal perceptions of 
women, which have a direct influence on the outcome and implementation of the law.  
 
Too much emphasis is given to law reform. Although legal campaigning is key in 
spreading and gathering support and other short term remedies, it has proven to not be 
enough in changing the patriarchal structure ingrained in our society. Nandita Shah and 
Nandita Gandhi argue that the law is not panacea. They note “no part of the women’s 
movement is under any illusion that the law is a genuinely transformative instrument . . . 
continuous engagement with the political, economic, and social basis of gender injustice” 
8 is required to successfully breakdown patriarchy. The new laws in theory progress 
women’s rights, however they face the same societal, cultural and patriarchal challenges 
regarding implementation. Many campaigns for reform resulted in legal changes, which 
often led to further “conservative and partial,”9 interpretation of the laws. As Flavia 
Agnes notes for example, as result of the rising violence against women in India, laws 
were amended to further protect their rights and include wider basis for harm. However, 
the harsher penalty resulted in fewer convictions than before.10  So, achieving more 
‘equal’ laws does not necessarily mean equality between men and women but is only a 
part of a bigger, broader struggle to reach gender equality. Nandita Haksar also notes that 
regardless of the rules of laws they cannot be separated from the values of society.11 For 
example, law’s implementation and interpretation are directly influenced by society.  
This is particularly appropriate for this thesis, as we will see in the following chapters. 
Even though khul’ was adopted over a decade ago, the ongoing resistance to it and 
perceptions of women as being caretakers and subordinate beings have no been 
significantly altered. Those perceptions are what undermine the purpose of legal change.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Id, at 6 
8 Id 
9 Id 
10 Id, at 7 
11 Id 
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Much like Menon and Shah and Ghandi, Lama Abu Odeh believes that simply giving 
women the same rights as men will not do much to attain the desired social change we 
need.  In her article Egyptian Feminism: Trapped in the Identity Debate, she looks at 
personal status law reform from the perspective of Egyptian feminists. She argues that 
relative equality should be the goal and not necessarily formal equality between men and 
women; “achieving substantive equality would require improving the daily bargaining 
position of women vis-a-vis their spouses, rather than simply granting them the same 
powers and responsibilities as men”12 This reinforces Menon’s view that it is unjust to 
treat unequals equally. Giving men and women the same rights will not change the social 
hierarchy between the two, but rather it is recognizing women’s rights outside of men’s 
rights that will.  
 
Like Abu Odeh and Menon, Deniz Kandiyoti criticizes traditional methods that rearrange 
and reinterpret the same patriarchal laws to fit women as being ineffective at breaking 
down patriarchy. In her article Gender, Power and Contestation: Rethinking Bargaining 
with Patriarchy, she explores other mechanisms of tackling gender equality and social 
change.13 For instance by strengthening “the capacity of disadvantaged groups, including 
women, to achieve a degree of articulation of their interests and to acquire the means to 
act in their furtherance.”14 Like Menon, this idea suggests that women’s rights should be 
sensitive to their needs and defined outside of men’s existing rights. Egyptian feminist 
activist’s efforts attempted to bend the existing patriarchal laws that had been in place to 
include more rights for women. By doing so, they were successful in reforming the legal 
code but not at breaking down patriarchy.  
 
Another important concept in this paper is resistance to personal status law reform in 
what Islamists believed to be an effort to preserve Islam. Lama Abu Odeh, Deniz 
Kandiyoti and Margot Badran agree that for fundamentalists, Muslim family law came to 
represent the last link with the Islamic state and control over women. Badran notes in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Id, at 190 
13 Deniz Kandiyoti, Gender, Power and Contestation: Rethinking Bargaining with Patriarchy, in 
FEMINIST VISIONS OF DEVELOPMENT: GENDER, ANALYSIS AND POLICY 135 (1998) 
14 Id, at 142 
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Feminists, Islam And Nation: Gender Making Of Modern Egypt despite the 
modernization efforts made in Egypt, Islamists would not give up control over personal 
status laws along with control over women’s rights: 
Family law became a last bastion of control over women. The patriarchal family would 
not relinquish this control, nor would the state exact it. Having removed all other areas of 
law from the jurisdiction of Islam, the state had left Muslim religious authorities in 
control of Islamic personal status laws.15  
 
Patriarchy and Islam were linked to the extent that the Islamic state came to be 
intertwined with patriarchal beliefs. Kandiyoti notes that the core areas of Islamic 
civilization “have historically coincided with areas of patriarchy, and encouraged a 
confusion between the assumed workings of Islam and those of a specific type of 
patriarchy,”16 especially in the degree of access to political participation, employment 
and matters of the family.  Confusion between what is truly based on Islamic principles 
and what is patriarchy is what fundamentalists were able to use to their advantage in 
order to mobilize the population to support their agendas.  
 
Islamists’ resistance to personal status law in general and khul’ in particular reflects their 
fear to threatening the status of the longstanding patriarchal structure, which they believe 
is sanctioned in Islam. Their resistance to reform was presented as protecting Islam, 
which made the debate on women’s rights “impossible to engage with except on their 
own terms.”17 Further, Odeh agrees that in the past century, feminist activists struggled 
with the fact that personal status law reform too often turned into a debate over Islamic 
law.18 Conservatives’ resistance to family law reform was often backed by verses from 
the Qur’an or Hadith to show that feminist ideals were un-Islamic. Religious 
conservatives’ resistance to khul’ forced reformers to challenge them on religious 
grounds and reinterpret verses to prove that their goals were religiously founded. As we 
will see in the following chapters, this ongoing resistance and attachment to the 
patriarchal interpretations of Islam have not changed but rather were reinforced by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 MARGOT BADRAN, FEMINISTS, ISLAM AND NATION: GENDER MAKING OF MODERN 
EGYPT, 10 (1995). 
16 Id 
17 MENON, supra note 5, at 123 
18 Lama Abu Odeh, Egyptian Feminism: Trapped in the Identity Debate, 16 Yale J.L. & Feminism 145, 172 
(2004) 
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state through implementation obstacles. 
 
In an effort to appease both Islamists who the Egyptian government both relied on and 
competed against for legitimacy, and the international community, which it depended on 
for much funding, the government developed what Abu Odeh calls a “centrist 
compromise.” 19  In her article Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The case of Egypt, she 
offers a comprehensive background on personal status law reform. She notes that in an 
effort to deal with both the religious conservatives as well as reformists, the Egyptian 
government adopted a “policy of splitting the difference between the demands of women 
activists in Egypt pushing for liberal feminist reforms and those of a conservative 
religious intelligentsia that was antagonistic to these reforms.”20 This centrist 
compromise was indeed what happened in the case of Egypt and the khul’ law of 2000. In 
an effort to conciliate Islamists and secularists, the Egyptian government adopted khul’ 
yet injected it with debilitating hurdles in the women’s path to divorce resulting in an 
unequal divorce process for women. The Supreme Constitutional Court also adopted this 
strategy to appease both Islamists and feminist activists after the year 1980 and the 
amendment of the constitution.21  However, Odeh does not explore the question of what 
if the government and the Islamists who oppose reform are one entity and what that could 
mean for women’s rights, which this paper aims to examine in chapter four.  
 
Another concept central to this paper is that more focus should be directed towards the 
effective implementation of the laws and not just law in the books. Nathalie Bernaud-
Maugiron and Dupret, in Breaking Up The Family, ask how the law can be a vehicle for 
social change when there are insurmountable hurdles imposed on women seeking a 
divorce. They argue that there is a conflict between efforts pursued by the legislature 
through the “adoption of a law and the practical effects of the text. This is the case with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Lama Abu Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1045 
(2004).   
20 Id   
21 See the ROLE OF THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN PERSONAL STATUS LAW REFORM in chapter II 
of this paper. 
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legal reforms related to divorce, which clash with social and economic obstacles.”22 In 
addition to Maugiron and Dupret, Mulki Al-Sharmani in Egyptian Family Courts: A 
Pathway of Women's Empowerment? agrees that effective implementation of the new 
laws is compromised by a number of inadequacies, which consequently impede women’s 
access to justice.23. Implementation difficulties along with mandatory reconciliation, 
forgoing all financial rights are examples of these inadequacies in the legal system that 
consequently take away from khul’s theoretical benefits. 
 
The above literature can help shed light on some of the issues discussed in this paper 
particularly the historical development of Egyptian family law. However, the literature on 
the law’s ability to change societal perceptions in the Egyptian context, specifically 
related to the khul’ law and the ongoing resistance to it, is limited. The renewed scrutiny 
post-revolution, epitomizes the underlying patriarchy from which this resistance stems, 
undermining the purpose of legal reform in advancing women’s position.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron & Baudouin Dupret, Breaking Up the Family:Divorce in Egyptian Law and 
Practice, 2 (2008). 
23 Mulki Al-Sharmani, Egyptian Family Courts: A Pathway of Women's Empowerment? Hawwa Volume 7, 
Issue 2, 89 (2009). 
	   11	  	  
 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL STATUS LAWS IN EGYPT24 
 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, in an effort to modernize, Egypt 
disposed of rules of Islamic law that had been in place.25 Egypt started borrowing 
European law, specifically the French code in all aspects except those related to family 
law.26 Family law, which deals with inheritance, marriage, divorce and custody for 
Muslims, remains based on interpretations of shari’a. 27 For conservatives who (and still 
are) opposed to Europeanization and secularization, keeping family law, particularly the 
control over women, under strict shari’a interpretations “came to symbolize the last 
bastion of a dismantled Islamic legal system, the reform of which threatened to flood 
Egypt with the European and the secular. Thus, attachment to medieval patriarchy came 
to mean attachment to the Islamic.28 This has resulted in confusion between what are 
truly Islamic values and unfounded patriarchal beliefs.  
 
These laws have seen the least progression and most resistance in Egyptian history.29 
History has proven that these laws are incredibly difficult to amend because of the 
resistance of conservatives as well as societal perceptions of women.30 In spite of the 
progression made by women in other areas like education, for instance, family law has 
remained “relatively unchanged and continues to undermine women’s full personhood in 
society.”31 Personal Status Laws often leave a lot of room for interpretation therefore they 
are viewed through the spectrum of predominantly males with patriarchal mindsets.32 In 
the event that there is not a clear definition or ruling on a specific matter, judges refer 
back to the most conservative of all interpretations, the Hanafi School.33 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 I use the terms Personal Status laws and family law interchangeably throughout this paper.  




29 Id, see also BADRAN supra note 15 
30 Maugiron, supra note 2, at 6 
31 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH , supra note 3, at 10 
32 Bernard-Maugiron &Dupret, From Jihan to Susanne. Twenty Years of Personal Status Law in Egypt, 
   19 Recht van de Islam 1 (2001) at 2. 
33 Oussama Arabi, The Dawning of the Third Millennium on Shari'a: Egypt's Law no. 1 of 2000, Women 
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As a result of the resistance to Personal Status Law reform, lawmakers avoided it since 
the subject generally stirred up a lot of controversy between conservatives who see 
“women as the bearers and perpetuators of cultural values and social mores,”34 on one 
hand and feminists and secularists on the other. To this day, women’s public affairs are 
handled by the state and their private affairs are controlled by Shari’a, which as we will 
see later makes it harder to bargain with for more rights. 
 
A.  DEVELOPMENT OF DIVORCE LAWS IN EGYPT 
The slow development of divorce laws beginning in 1920 and ending in 2000 reflects the 
challenges that personal status law reform faced, and the controversy it generated, 
making it difficult to amend. 
 
1. Laws no. 25/1920 and no.25/1929: Extending grounds for harm 
Prior to 1920, the Hanafi family law, which had been in place since 1897, only allowed 
divorce on the basis of the inability of the husband to consummate the marriage and his 
apostasy from Islam.35 In the beginning of the twentieth century, laws No. 25 of 1920 and 
No. 25 of 1929 widened the definition of harm based on the Maliki School of 
interpretation, increasing the chances of a woman being granted judicial divorce. 36 
Depending the suing woman’s ability to convince the judge,37 she can be granted a 
divorce on the basis that she suffered harm from one or more of the following: systematic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
May Divorce at Will, Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, 7 (2001); for more on the Hanafi code “also 
called Qadri Pasha Code by the name of the then Minister of Justice, codified sharî‘a rules regarding 
family law on the basis of the Hanafi doctrine. The code, made of more than 600 provisions, was never 
promulgated and never acquired binding legal force. However, it resulted in a concise and accessible 
account of the Hanafi doctrine and became a standard manual for the judges of the sharî‘a courts, who did 
not have to look for legal provisions in multiple medieval treatises and commentaries, hard to access, 
anymore. It advocated a particularly patriarchal structure for the family.”  
34 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 10 
35 Arabi, supra note 33, at 2 
36  DAWOUD SUDQI EL ALAMI &  DOREEN HINCHCLIFFE, ISLAMIC MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LAWS  OF THE 
ARAB  WORLD 56 (1996) see also Laws no. 25/1920 and 25/1929, State Information Services website, 
available at http://www.sis.gov.eg/ar/Story.aspx?sid=66171 accessed on May 5th, 2013 
37Arabi, supra note 33, at 2, notes that the woman’s ability to persuade the Judge is crucial for the outcome 
of a divorce case. See also Maugiron, supra note 22, at 56; for the importance of women’s persuasion 
abilities in a divorce case.  
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maltreatment; non-provision of maintenance; prolonged absence or imprisonment; and an 
incurable disease.38  
 
Although laws no. 25/1920 and 25/1929 widened the definition of harm, it was still the 
woman’s responsibility to provide witnesses and prove to the judge that she indeed 
endured the said harm. The fate of a divorce case was up to the judge’s discretion as well 
as the women’s persuasion abilities,39 and even then, there were no guarantees that the 
judge would rule in her favor.40  
 
Finding witnesses was a huge obstacle since much of the abuse takes place in the 
couple’s home where there are no witnesses.41 This was especially burdensome in cases 
of physical abuse, where women would have to “provide the court with a medical 
certificate from a government hospital outlining her condition and two witnesses 
(preferably not related to her) who saw the abuse occur.” 42 In addition, “a woman’s 
testimony is worth half that of a man.”43Therefore, a battered woman would need 
testimonies from either two men, four women, or one man and two women.”44  
 
2.  Law no. 44/1979: Polygamy  
Half a century later, President Anwar Al Sadat issued, by presidential decree, decree-law 
No.44 of 1979.45 This law was revolutionary, as it gave women a lot of rights compared 
to the 1920 and 1929 laws, which were still in place at the time.46 For the first time in 
Egyptian history, polygamy was considered sufficient evidence of harm without the 
requirement of actually proving harm. The act of the husband taking on a second wife, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE supra note 36, at 58 see also Arabi, supra note 29, at 2 
39 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 22 
40 Judges often based harm on a woman’s social status and upbringing because there was not set definition 
of harm making the outcome of divorce case unpredictable. See Maugiron, supra note 22, at 56 
41 Id 
42 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 22 
43 Egyptian jurisprudence applies the witness testimony rules of the Hanafi school, which requires the 
testimony of two male witnesses or two females and one male witness. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 
3, at 22 See also Amina Chemais, Obstacles to Divorce for Muslim Women in Egypt, Women Living Under 
Muslim Laws Special Dossier 1, 3 (1996). 
44 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 22 
45 Also referred to by “jihan’s law” president Sadat’s wife’s efforts and support to the law.  
46Maugiron, supra note 22, at 56 
	   14	  	  
alone, was enough for the woman to be granted a divorce, as long as she filed within one 
year of her knowledge.47 This also meant that husbands had to inform their wives of their 
second marriage, which was not required before. This was liberating for women who 
could not otherwise get a divorce, were forced into living with multiple wives and had to 
go through the grueling court procedures of proving harm. Women were also given the 
right to the marital home as long as they had physical custody of their children.48 Again, 
this was revolutionary since women are not generally entitled to marital assets (i.e marital 
home, land, car etc.) after divorce and the non-waged contribution made by the wives are 
not taken into consideration. This of course, compared to the restrictive previous laws, 
was emancipating for many women. 
 
In order to bypass religious conservatives and members of parliament, Sadat decreed the 
law No. 44 of 1979 while Parliament was on recess.49 Consequently, this law was 
vehemently rejected. Women’s newfound powers were not taken lightly amongst 
conservatives who perceived the law “as constituting an indirect restriction to polygamy 
which, since it is legally and religiously legitimate, should not be considered as harm for 
the first wife.”50 Moreover, many judges refused to implement the new law or take it into 
consideration when ruling a divorce case because they did not agree with it.51  
Mervat Hatem argues that Islamists were successful at mobilizing people against the law 
and they “tapped the latent male opposition to their diminishing monopoly of power by 
presenting the new laws as denying them the right to take more than one wife.”52 They 
also accused Jihan Sadat along with the feminists supporting the law of being too 
westernized,53 and “different from the average devout Muslim woman who recognized 
the religious wisdom behind the gender asymmetry between men and women in the 
family and sanctioned by the Qur'an.” 54 Furthermore, they claimed that polygamy is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE supra note 36, at 51 
48 Maugiron, supra note 32, at 4 
49Id 
50 Maugiron, supra note 22, at 56 
51Id 
52  Mervat Hatem, Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism, 24 
International Journal of Middle East Studies , 242 (1992). 
53 Lynn Welchman, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE: First time Family Law Codifications in Three Gulf States, IN 
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW BRISTOL, 8(Atkin, Bill, Jordan, 2010). 
54 Hatem, supra note 52, at 243 
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protected by shari’a and to restrict it would be “in violation of the shari'a and thus 
represented the views of atheists who were engaged in subverting Islamic rules.” 55 
In1985 the Supreme Constitutional Court struck down the law on procedural grounds.56 
 
3.  Law no. 100/1985: A step in the wrong direction 
Later that year, amendments were made to the annulled 1979 law. A more patriarchy-
friendly version was adopted to appease judges and conservatives. Law No. 100/1985 
was passed, but lacked many of the progressive characteristics of its predecessor.  
Law no. 100/1985 now mentioned polygamy as potential basis of harm.57 However, it is 
still the woman’s responsibility to prove harm to the judge as well as provide witnesses to 
attest that she indeed received harm directly related to the polygamy.  To make it clear 
that the government has no intention of limiting the husband’s absolute right to 
polygamy, the explanatory note clarified that “the 1985 law does not aim to restrict the 
husbands right to polygamy, but to offer a remedy to the first wife who would be 
damaged by her husband’s remarriage.”58  
 
As stated before, finding witnesses was especially difficult for women because the abuse 
usually happens within the couple’s home when there are no witnesses.59 Judges also 
required considerable amounts of evidence for harm and since there is no set definition of 
what qualifies as substantial harm, “judges often grant divorces in a discriminatory 
fashion based on various subjective interpretations of harm, including linking a woman’s 
socio-economic background with her ability to tolerate and endure violence.”60 
Therefore, a woman from an upper social class may be granted a divorce for minimal 
physical abuse but the divorce may not be granted to a woman from a lower social class 
based on the same amount of harm. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  Id  
56 Supreme Constitutional Court Ruling, Case no. 28, of May 4, 1985, available at 
http://www.hccourt.gov.eg/Rules/getRule.asp?ruleId=342&searchWords= 
57 EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE supra note 36, at 52 
58 Id, at 217 
59Id  
60 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 29 
	   16	  	  
In addition, a woman’s right to the couple’s home while having custody was changed to 
husbands providing housing expenses.61 Again, giving absolute power to the judge to 
decide how much money to be given. In reality, men often got away without paying 
adequate housing expenses and court-ordered collectors were often easily bribed. 62  
 
Bailiffs assigned to notify a husband of a court session or an alimony ruling often take 
bribes in return for neglecting these duties. In return for a bribe, a bailiff will inform the 
court that he could not locate the person. It is easy for a husband to run away and it is 
easy for a husband to pay bribes. The government does not prioritize the implementation 
of court rulings.63 
 
The situation of women seeking a divorce prior to 2000 was arduous in comparison to 
men’s unconditional right to divorce. In addition to the long amount of time cases took, 
decisions left up to the whims of judges and inadequate implementation of court rulings, 
women had no guarantee that a divorce case would be ruled in their favor.  
 
 
B. KHUL’  
1. Khul’ in Islam  
Islam has allowed divorce on several grounds if life between spouses became unbearable 
and reconciliation impossible.64 The Prophet denounced divorce however, when it is not 
necessary, saying, "Of all the things that Islam has permitted, divorce is the most hated 
by Allah."65 Although divorce is most commonly initiated by men, there always existed 
khul’ in early Islamic law. Khul’ is a way by which a wife can initiate a divorce without 
having to prove harm and without the husband’s consent provided, she return the dower 
given to her.66  
 
There are precedents of khul’ as a way for women to exit a bad marriage in exchange for 
financial compensation and all four classical schools of shari’a interpretation agree that a 
wife has the right to khul’. As the Egyptian historian Abdal-Rahman Abdal-Rehim, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE supra note 36, at 52 
62HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 33 
63Id 
64 ABDUR RAHMAN I. DOI, SHARI'AH: THE ISLAMIC LAW 168 (1984). 
65 ABDUR RAHMAN I. DOI, WOMAN IN SHARI'AH (ISLAMIC LAW) 84 (1989). 
66 Id, See also Arabi, supra note 33 
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reviewed cases of khul’ during the Ottoman Empire, women were allowed to divorce in 
exchange for their financial compensation to the men;  
A large portion of the cases that wives brought before the judge, involved husbands who were 
unwilling to divorce and who had not broken any of the conditions in the marriage contract.  ... In 
such cases the wife demanded khul' (repudiation) by which the judge allowed for legal separation, 
but on condition that the wife forfeit any alimony. ... Frequently, the wife was also required to pay 
back all or part of the dowry paid to her by her husband at the time of marriage.67 
 
Once the divorce is final, a husband may not return to the woman without her consent or 
appeal the decision. According to the Maliki school of interpretation, which is the one 
closest to the khul’ law that Egypt adopted in 2000, Habība, the wife of Thabit Bin Qais 
came to the Prophet (p.b.u.h) saying: 
 
“I see no fault with Thabit's conduct or his religious demeanor, but I hate to disobey (the rules of) 
Islam". The Prophet (p.b.u.h.) said: "Would you give him back his garden?" She said: "Yes". Then 
the Prophet said (to Thabit): "Accept (iqbal) the garden and divorce her (talliqha) a single 
divorce". [In another wording:] Then the Prophet ordered him ('amarahu) and he separated from 
her.68 
  
There are three versions of the Habība story according to the Maliki School.69 The first 
two define khul’ as a transaction whereby a woman initiates the divorce and returns the 
dower to the husband in exchange for her freedom. In the third version of the Habība 
story, emphasis is given to the husband’s response and the importance of the husband’s 
consent in granting the wife a divorce.70 It states, 
The precedent (al-sunna) in separation (khul') is that anyone who divorces for a compensation 
without stipulating or indicating the nature of the divorce, then it is a separation (khul'); and 
separation(al-khul')is a single definitive divorce with no possibility of retrieval. ... The Prophet 
invited Thabit b. Qays to be present, and he told him about Habiba and about her positive response 
to the Prophet's asking her whether she would be willing to give him back his garden. Thabit 
said:" This is to my liking; Yes (na'am)".The Prophet (p .b.u.h.) said:" Then she gives it back," ... 
and he told Thabit:" It is just one statement (hiya wahida).71 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Abdal-Rahman Abdal-Rehim, The Family and Gender Laws in Egypt during the Ottoman Period, in 
WOMEN, THE FAMILY, AND DIVORCE LAWS IN ISLAMIC HISTORY, ed. Amira El-Azhary Sonbol, 105 
(Syracuse University Press, 1996), See also Arabi, supra note 29, at 3 quoting Abdal Rehim.  
68Abu Abdallah Al-Bukhari, Al-Jami' al-Sahih, 9 Vols (Cairo: People's Edition, n.d.), 6: 162-163. Quoted 
from Arabi, supra note 33, at 16, see also DOI supra note 64, at 298 for a narrative Sahih al Bukhari hadith 
(bab al khul wa kayfiyyat al talaq fihi) 
69 DOI, supra note 64, at 298 
70 Id 
71 Arabi, supra note 33, at 9, Quoting Sahnun b. Sa'id, Al-Mudawwana al-Kubra li'l Imam Malik b. Anas, 
231 (4 Vols Cairo: Kayriyya Press, 1325 AH, Vol. 2) 
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The four Sunni schools of law have differences of opinion regarding the sum to be paid 
by a wife to her husband in exchange for divorce, depending on the version of the Habība 
Hadith that the jurists approve. In the Maliki School of interpretation, the sum of money 
to be paid to the husband is negotiated between the couple, but the wife cannot be 
coerced into it.72 Nevertheless, they all agree that a husband is entitled to compensation 
and the requirement of the husband’s consent. Although many have agreed that the 
Prophet ordered Thabit, imperatively, to take the garden, all four schools do not 
recognize khul’ without the husband’s consent.73  While the Maliki school is the one 
closest to the khul’ law adopted by Egyptian legislatures, it departs from the Maliki 
interpretation on the issue of the husband’s consent.  
 
2. Khul’ in Egyptian law: Law no.1/2000 
Although khul’ as a way in which a woman can initiate a divorce without the need for 
harm existed in pre-modern Egyptian history, the Habība story being a prime example, it 
was not until the year 2000 that the Egyptian legislature amended the personal status 
code,74 to include Law No. 1 of the Year 2000: Regarding the Promulgation of a Law to 
Organize Certain Conditions and Procedures of Litigation in Matters of Personal Status. 
Despite the fact that law no. 1/2000 included many provisions, it quickly became known 
as the Khul’ law, based on article 20, which stipulates:  
A married couple may mutually agree to khul’…However, if they do no agree and the wife sues 
demanding it, and separates herself from her husband by giving up all her financial legal rights, 
and restores to him the sadaq he gave to her, then the court is to divorce her from him.  
The court shall not rule for divorce through khul’ except after trying to reach reconcilement 
between the spouses, and after trying to reach reconcilement between the spouses, and after 
delegating two arbiters to continue reconcilement endeavors between them, within a period of not 
exceeding three months and also after the wife explicitly declares that she hates living with her 
husband, that there is no way for continuing marital life between them, and that she fears to 
commit a violation of the restrictions that God has places of that hatred. The separation effected by 
khul’ is under all circumstances an irrevocable divorce. The courts decision is under all 
circumstances not subject to appeal, in any of the forms of appeal.75 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 DOI, supra note 65 see also Revoking Financial Rights in chapter three of this paper. 
73 Arabi , supra note 33, at 12 
74 “Though formally a procedural law, it included however some substantive provisions like an article 
providing for khul‘ divorce and one allowing wives married ‘urfi to get a judicial dissolution of their 
marriage. These 2 provisions were hidden in this procedural law to be adopted more easily and to avoid the 
passionate debates a proper substantive law would have generated in the parliament and in society.”  
See Bernard-Maugiron supra note 2, at 4.  
75 Law No. 1 of the Year 2000: Regarding the Promulgation of a Law to Organize Certain Conditions and 
Procedures of Litigation in Matters of Personal Status, Available on State Information Services website at 
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Even though each of the four schools of Shari’a interpretation have made it clear that 
consent is crucial, Egyptian legislatures were able to omit the need of consent in the new 
law. After amending article two of the 1971 Egyptian constitution in 1980, Shari’a 
became the main source of legislation rather than a source of legislation.76 By using 
takhayyur77and talfīq,78 Egyptian legislatures were able to use a wider, more moderate 
interpretation of the Maliki school.79 Furthermore, in 1993 the Supreme Constitutional 
Court differentiated between the absolute rules of shari’a, which are not open to 
interpretation, and the relative rules shari’a, which leave more leeway for ijtīhad.80 That 
said, because the Habība hadith did not explicitly mention the husband’s consent, and 
because the Qur’an and Hadith are absolute principles of shari’a, Egyptian jurists were 
able to use ijtīhad. to justify their deviation from the four schools of interpretation.81  
 
Khul’ was introduced by the group of feminist activists known as the ‘Group of Seven’,82 
who strategically used a religious discourse to argue that khul’ is indeed a woman’s right 
in an attempt to avoid opposition.83 Even after Al-Azhar affirmed that khul’ is in 
conformity with shari’a, the law was still the subject of much controversy. As a result of 
pressure from opponents, the government made concessions and included a mandatory 
three-month reconciliation period.84 This was seen as the government’s way to appease 
Islamists who feared that women are irrational and hasty in resorting to khul’.85 If the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.egypt.gov.eg/arabic/laws/download.pdf (accessed on May 30, 2013) Transl. in Arabi, supra 
note 29, at 6 
76 Supreme Constitutional Court Ruling, Case no. 28 of May 4, 1985  available at 
http://www.hccourt.gov.eg/Rules/getRule.asp?ruleId=330&searchWords= trans. in Arabi, supra note 33,  
at 6, see also Text of the current Egyptian constitution as well as older constitutions can be found on the 
Supreme Constitutional Court’s website. Available at 
http://www.hccourt.gov.eg/Constitutions/Constitution71.asp 
77 Choosing one opinion over another from the different schools 
78 Combining interpretations of the different schools creating a hybrid that does not belong to a specific 
school, see Arabi, supra note 33, at 19 
79 Id  
80 Supreme Constitutional Court Ruling, case no.7 of 15 May 1993 available at 
http://www.hccourt.gov.eg/Rules/getRule.asp?ruleId=520&searchWords= 
81 Arabi, supra note 33, at 21 
82 NADIA SONNEVELED, KHUL’ DIVORCE IN EGYPT: PUBLIC DEBATED, JUDICIAL PRACTICES, AND EVERYDAY 
LIFE, 37 (2012), See also Arabi, supra note 29 
83 Strategies adopted by reformers will be discussed in detail in chapter three of this paper. 
84Al Sharmani, supra note 23, at 18 
85 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH supra note 3, at 28, see also Tadros supra note 170 
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couple has children, an additional three-month reconciliation period with a thirty-day 
waiting period in between attempts was adopted to the law.86 After the reconciliation 
attempt(s), a woman must make the declaration that “she detests life with him, that 
continuation of married life between them became impossible, and that she fears she will 
not maintain the ‘limits of God’ due to this detestation”87 is sufficient for the judge to 
grant the divorce. Although still unequal relative to men’s absolute right to divorce, khul’ 
threatened the patriarchal structure and gender hierarchy embedded in our society by 
giving women the freedom to exit an unwanted marriage without the consent of the 
husband or the judge.  In 2002, khul’ received increased legitimacy when the Supreme 
Constitutional Court confirmed that khul’ is constitutional and is in conformity with 
Shari’a.88 
 
In theory, khul’ is much quicker than a traditional fault-based divorce of law no. 
100/1985, which can take years to be resolved. In reality, this timeframe was often 
prolonged because of implementation difficulties, mandatory reconciliation and disputes 
over paid dowry.89 These challenges will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
C. THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND FAMILY 
LAW REFORM 
 
In charge of determining the constitutionality of laws and interpreting the existing 
legislative texts, the Supreme Constitutional Court has the power to pass or annul any law 
that it is not in conformity with the Egyptian Constitution. The Court was established in 
1979 after the 1971 Constitution called for its creation to ensure compliance with 
constitutional rights.90 The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt played an important 
role in Personal Status Law reform in Egypt in “determining the nature of public life in 
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87 Maugiron, supra note 22, at 58 
88 Supreme Constitutional Court ruling, case 201 of December 15th, 2002 available at  
http://www.hccourt.gov.eg/Rules/getRule.asp?ruleId=124&searchWords= 
89 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 50  
90 Articles 174-178 of the 1971 constitution available on the Supreme Constitutional Court website, 
http://www.hccourt.gov.eg/About/chairmanword.asp  (last visited May 30th, 2013)  
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Egypt as a modern state formally governed by principles of Islamic Shari'a laws."91 
 
Many laws of personal status risk being struck down by the Egyptian Constitutional 
Court for not being in conformity with shari’a, specifically against article two of the 
constitution.92 Lama Abu Odeh notes that the significant majority of Supreme 
Constitutional Court cases under article 2 are of personal status law. This demonstrates 
how often opponents of personal status law reform invoked shari’a in hopes to curb 
reform. The amendment of Article 2 of the constitution in 1980 marked a new look at 
interpreting laws. The Supreme Constitutional Court in its ruling of May 4th, 1985 
explained:   
[T]he aim of the new formulation of Article 2 of the Constitution is to force the legislator to have 
recourse to the commands of Shari'a, to the exclusion of any other source, in order to discover 
what he is searching for; then, if he does not find there an explicit ruling, he is to employ the 
Shari'a resources of interpretive effort (al-ijtihadiyya) in order to arrive at the proper rules to 
follow and which do not transgress the foundations and general principles of Shari'a.93 
 
The new amendment inspired conservatives to “argue that certain legislative reforms in 
family law were un-Islamic, or contrary to the Shari'a.”94 Therefore, The Supreme 
Constitutional Court received many claims on the bases of article 2, however, avoided 
them by either annulling laws based on procedural grounds or by invoking the non-
retroactivity rule which exempts all laws prior to 1980 from challenges under article 2.95  
The Supreme Constitutional Court tended to not get involved in interpreting shari'a, and 
has instead “followed a strict technical principle,"96 on challenges of un-constitutionality. 
For instance, after president Sadat decreed law no. 44/1979, which was challenged for 
being against shari’a for restricting polygamy, the Supreme Constitutional Court struck 
down the law in its ruling on May 4th, 1985 based on procedural grounds and not on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Ran Hirschi, Resituating the Judicialization of Politics: Bush v. Gore  as a Global Trend,  15 CAN. J.L. 
&  JURIS. 191,197 (2002). 
92 Odeh, supra note 19, 1137 “It is interesting that non· religious laws are rarely brought to the attention of 
the Court for non-conformity with Article 2.  
93Supreme Constitutional Court Ruling, Case no. 28 of May 4, 1985 
http://www.hccourt.gov.eg/Rules/getRule.asp?ruleId=330&searchWords= trans. in Arabi supra note 33, at 
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94 Odeh, supra note 19, at 1050 
95 Marie-Claire Foblets & Baudouin Dupret, Contrasted Identity Claims Before Egyptian and Belgian 
Courts, in LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 63 (Baudouin Dupret et. al. eds., 1999), see also Odeh 
supra note 19, at 1137 
96 Foblets & Dupret, supra note 95, at 63 
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article 2.97 The Supreme Constitutional Court claimed that there was no real emergency 
for the president to decree the law while Parliament was on recess or a need to amend the 
previous laws of 25/1920 and 25/1929.98 Therefore, law no. 44/1979 was considered 
unconstitutional.99 The annulment of law no. 44/1979 was seen as a huge setback for 
feminist activists and a victory for Islamists.100 
 
It was not until the year 1993, after avoiding article 2 twelve consecutive times,101 that 
the Supreme Constitutional Court differentiated between absolute and relative principles 
of shari’a. The former is not open to interpretation, whereas the latter may change based 
on societal need and ijtīhad..  
This signifies that no legislative text may contradict those formal rules of Shari'a 
whose origin and meaning are definitive (qat'iyyat al-thubit wa'l dalala): these 
rules and their delimitation cannot be the object of interpretive effort (ijtihaid). ... 
It is inconceivable, therefore, that the content thereof be modified according to 
changes in time and place. The authority of the High Constitutional Court in this 
regard is limited to safe guarding their implementation and their overruling any 
other legal rule that contradicts them.102 
 
The Supreme Constitutional Court was subsequently faced with a number of important 
cases being challenged under article 2. For example, on August 14th, 1994, article 11 of 
law no. 25/1929 (as amended by law no. 100/1985) was challenged under article 2.103 
This article gives the judge the power to grant a divorce to a suing wife that has 
demonstrated harm, darar, as a result of her husband taking on a second wife.104 The 
plaintiff argued that he alone has the right to divorce his wife, claiming that it is in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




100 Maugiron, supra note 32, at 5 
101 Odeh, supra note 19, at 1137  
102 Supreme Constitutional Court Ruling, Case no.7, of May 15, 1993.  Available at 
http://www.hccourt.gov.eg/Rules/getRule.asp?ruleId=520&searchWords=  See also trans. in Arabi, supra 
note 33, at 10 
103 Article 11 of law no. 25/1929 amended by 100/1985 stipulates "[a] wife whose husband takes a second 
wife may petition for divorce from him if she is affected by some material or moral harm of a kind which 
would make it impossible for a couple such as them to continue living together, even if she has not 
stipulated in the contract that he should not take further wives..." See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE supra note 
36, at 58 
104 Supreme Constitutional Court Ruling, case no. 35 of 14 August 1994. Available at 
http://www.hccourt.gov.eg/Rules/getRule.asp?ruleId=600&searchWords= 
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violation of shari’a as it restricts his right to polygamy. In its ruling, the court 
acknowledged men’s unconditional right to polygamy, however, it did not see a woman’s 
right to file for divorce as a threat to men’s right to polygamy.105 The court further 
declared that giving the judge ultimate power in deciding a divorce case, and not leaving 
it up to the discretion of the wife herself, ensures that women’s claims of harm are 
founded and "real not illusory, actual not imagined, demonstrable not assumed, 
independent of the incident of the later marriage although occasioned by it."106 Therefore, 
the court declared that article 11 of law no. 25/1929 (amended by law 100/1985) was not 
unconstitutional.  
 
Furthermore, in 1996, the Supreme Constitutional Court was faced with the issue of 
Islamic dress. A Ministerial decree made by the Minister of Education prohibiting girls 
from wearing the headscarf (hijab or niqab) in schools, was being challenged under 
article 2.107 The edict stirred much controversy and resistance from Islamist groups, 
leading the Minister to reduce the tone of it to allow girls who had permission from their 
parents to wear it.108 The Supreme Constitutional Court’s ruling on May 18,1996 
declared that since edict no. 113 of 1994 which requires all girls to wear a uniform in 
public schools does not require girls to wear the hijab, and after examining relevant 
versus of the Qur’an that discuss women’s dress, it concluded that although covering up 
certain parts of the body is understood, the Qur’an does not explicitly require women to 
cover up the hair or face.109 In addition, they concluded that according to Prophetic 
precedence (sunna), the Prophet did not force women to cover their hair.110 Therefore, the 
Court declared that it is a matter more to do with modesty than religious requirement, and 
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107 Supreme Constitutional Court Ruling, case no. 8 of 18 May 1996. Available at 
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108 Odeh, supra note 19, at 1141 
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the Ministerial decree no. 208 of 1994 was declared constitutional as it did not violate the 
principle of modesty.111 
 
On May 3rd, 1997, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled on the question of 
maintenance due to a wife who continued to work despite her husband wanting her to 
stay at home. 112 The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of article 1 of law no. 
25/1920, amended by law no.100/1985, regarding a wife’s obedience to her husband.113 
While the court agreed that a women’s maintenance is dependent on her obedience, it 
acknowledged that once he has given her permission to do so either implicitly or 
explicitly it could not be revoked unless it is against the interest of the family or the wife 
abuses this power.114 Therefore, the court declared that article 1 of law no. 25/1920, 
amended by law no.100/1985 was indeed constitutional.115  
 
In 1997 the Supreme Constitutional Court was presented with a case challenging the 
constitutionality of article 11 of law no. 25/1929 (amended by law no. 100/1985), which 
gives the judge the power to grant a woman a divorce if the reconciliation is unsuccessful 
or impossible.116 A wife refused to return to the marital home and asked the judge to 
grant her a divorce. The husband claimed that article 11 was unconstitutional, because 
only he has the power to divorce his wife. On July 7th 1997, the court ruled that indeed 
the divorce is an absolute right to the man. However, it reaffirmed that in the event of 
discord between spouses, the Qur’an states117 that two arbiters from each of the spouse’s 
families must try to reconcile the couple who can then recommend divorce and it did not 
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prohibit judges from granting the divorce.118 Although the Qur’an does not state what 
happens if the reconciliation attempt fails, by exercising ijtīhad, the court declared that 
the arbiters can recommend divorce to the judge and he may make the ultimate decision, 
which is in conformity with shari’a. 119 Therefore, article 11 of law. no 25/1929 amended 
by law no. 100/1985 is not unconstitutional. 
 
Further, the Khul’ law of 2000 passed a significant hurdle when it was brought to the 
Supreme Constitutional Court and challenged under article 2 of the Egyptian 
constitution.120 The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of article 20 of law number 
1/2000 claiming that it is against shari’a because he did not consent to the khul’. In the 
Supreme Constitutional Court ruling of December 15, 2002, it affirmed that the khul’ law 
was indeed in conformity with shari’a.121 For reformers, the Supreme Constitutional 
Court ’s decision was the ultimate test of the controversy surrounding the khul’ law and 
the future of it. The passing of the khul’ and the support of the Supreme Constitutional 
Court was a huge victory for feminist reformers and human rights advocates. 
 
The Supreme Constitutional Court position on personal status law reform has been 
fundamental in family law reform and the advancement of women’s rights. It was clear, 
in the beginning, that it avoided ruling under article 2 and getting involved in interpreting 
shari’a.122 The Court employed its power to exercise ijtīhad to interpret certain laws that 
benefit women, without moving away from shari’a. As Lama Abu Odeh argues “these 
particular cases, in their aggregate, delimit the Court's ideological position on the social 
matters at hand. Each case, like the majority of such cases, presents the Court with the 
question of what to do about the ''battle of the sexes" and the fate of patriarchy in 
Egypt.”123 The Supreme Constitutional Court’s ruling of 2002 on khul’ law marked an 
important eraits support of reform. Although it did not attempt to limit men’s unilateral 
right to divorce or polygamy, it gave women an option to leave a polygamous marriage 	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and gave judges the right to intervene by allowing a divorce if reconciliation is 
impossible. Many have criticized the Court for taking a middle of the road approach. For 
instance, Lama Abu Odeh and Ran Hirschil have argued that in an effort to appease both 
Islamists and feminist activists, the Court has taken an intermediate stance in almost 
every case that it was faced with after 1980.124 
 
The Supreme Constitutional Court ’s affirmation of the khul’ law was a step in the right 
direction for women’s rights. Although the court did not go as far as limiting men’s 
absolute right to divorce, it did provide women with an avenue to get out of a bad 
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III.  RESISTANCE TO KHUL’ 
This chapter will discuss the challenges that the khul’ law of 2000 faced and the nature of 
the debate surrounding it, as women’s new decision making power provoked the 
patriarchal order from which the resistance stems. 
 
A. THE FUNDAMENTALIST DISCOURSE 
 
The 1990s witnessed a greater participation from reformers, as well as Non-
Governmental Organizations and women’s groups who called for gender equality and 
were often backed by development and international organizations. At the same time, 
“the more liberal political climate also allowed Islamists of various signatures to claim 
greater public presence in mobilizing the people against family law reform.”125 
Fundamentalists strategically used mosques to spread their agendas and refused rational 
and open discussions with secularists.126 Their approach was essentially based on 
“persuasion (to “see the true path”) or conversion (to “return to the true faith”) rather than 
debate, reasoning, or argument.”127 The constant struggle between reformists who wanted 
to modernize family law and advance women’s rights versus fundamentalists who often 
manipulated “rhetoric of the sacred texts,”128 to rationalize patriarchal interpretations of 
Islam has resulted in a purely political struggle rather than a moral or religious one.129 
 
The fundamentalist discourse comes directly from authoritative texts “which bases its 
claims on truth and validity.”130 This type of discourse is often successful at blocking any 
kind of criticism or substitution, therefore making it a valuable one to use in order to 
legitimize one’s beliefs. Here, fundamentalists succeed in obstructing other methods of 	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thinking,131 and replacing them with strict interpretations of their version of Islam, 
making it difficult for secularists to challenge them.  
 
Activists’ efforts targeted amending existing codes and adding provisions that enhanced 
women’s rights, which resulted in successful reform of the legal code. Legal campaigning 
is key in spreading awareness, gaining support, and pressuring governments.132 However, 
it alone cannot be seen as an end result that changes the patriarchal interpretations of laws 
and perceptions in society.133 Even though Egyptian feminist activists knew that women’s 
status had to be upgraded,134 they did not address the patriarchal mentalities or societal 
norms that are often concealed under the guise of shari’a. Instead, they attempted to 
repair the existing, sexist laws and did not go beyond the idea of tajdīd and takhayyur.135 
Resorting to tajdīd was an effort made by feminist activists to reclaim the rights that they 
believed were given to them in Islam, but deferred from the Islamists’ sexist mode of 
thinking.  
 
B. WHY REFORM? 
 
Prior to the adoption of khul’, the challenges women faced when seeking divorce were 
highly problematic. Women’s situation reinforced misogynist perceptions in society that 
portrayed them as subordinate second-class citizens.136 These unequal divorce laws were 
still in place to maintain the imbalance between the genders; “the entire mechanisms of 
society could alter but the patriarchal family unit was guarded from any such change.”137 
Judges had absolute discretion in granting the divorce and it would take years for women 
to get a divorce finalized. 	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Aside from being in limbo for years, women faced other hurdles in their path to divorce.  
Poor enforcement of court rulings for alimony and child support, for instance, was 
challenging because husbands rarely paid it.138 Further, women would not qualify for any 
social assistance from the government, since they were still legally married.139 The 
divorce process for women was dire as women struggled with the law and the courts for 
years to be granted a divorce, which was an unconditional right for men.  
 
There was a visible disconnect between the perception of women and their lived realities. 
The socio-economic situation of women was changing, which directly challenged the 
presumed Islamic notions of the male breadwinner and the realities of family life.140 
Because of financial constraints on the family, more and more women were financially 
supporting their families but were still denied some rights that seemed to be only reserved 
for men. Feminist activists along with women's Non-Governmental Organizations and 
human rights organizations were instrumental in bringing the issue of family law reform 
back on the agenda.141 It was the right time to address personal status law reform, which 
had been a battleground for perpetuating women’s subjugation since the start of the 
century.142  
 
C. STRATEGY ADOPTED BY REFORMERS: 
Reformers knew that in order for khul’ to pass, they had to adopt the same language, the 
language of Islam, as the opposition. On the other hand, they had to refrain from using 
the “westernized” language of human rights and equality.143 Although many international 
and development organizations helped advance the law, it was necessary to present khul’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH supra note 3. “Women can spend years tracking down their ex-husbands for 
child support. “Once an ex-husband is deemed missing, they are provided with little assistance from the 
police or any other government authority. If a woman does not know her husband’s exact address to 
forward to the bailiff (the court official responsible for announcing and implementing court orders relating 
to a case), she is simply denied the money she was awarded in the court ruling.”  
139 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 34 
140 Al Sharmani, supra note 23 
141 Sonneveld, supra note 82, at 36 
142 Badran, supra note15 
143 Mona Zulficar  The Islamic Marriage Contract In Egypt, in THE ISLAMIC MARRIAGE CONTRACT: CASE 
STUDIES IN ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 242 (A.Quraishi ed. Harvard University Press 2008). 
	   30	  	  
from a conformity with shari’a angle versus equality and women’s emancipation.144 
 
As a result of the resistance,145 and later annulment, of decree law 44/1979, reformers 
needed new strategies to enhance their legitimacy by using Islam to advance women’s 
rights and position in society. They needed to examine and reinterpret shari’a principles 
in order to legitimize khul’ and prove that their efforts were in fact religiously based, 
therefore curbing resistance by fundamentalists. The Group of Seven adopted a strategy 
to use the language of Islam to back up khul,’146 and avoided the language of human 
rights and equality, which often got them accused of being anti-Islamic or conspiring 
with the west to destroy the Muslim family.147 Mona Zulficar, a prominent lawyer and 
member of the Group of Seven, notes that these accusations forced women’s groups to 
implement new strategies that challenged Islamists on religious grounds: 
 
This led to the emergence of a public sphere in which the religious language of the 
shari’a is utilized to persuade opponents and to gain legitimacy for one’s actions. In this 
case of the khul’ law, women activists sought to reach out to the masses by speaking what 
they perceived to be “their” language, the language of Islam.148 
 
The activists knew that Islam could not be left up to traditionalists’ authority;149 and went 
to great lengths to show that advancing women’s rights is not against shari’a, nor is it a 
western conspiracy, but rather in line with the principles of justice portrayed in shari’a.150 
They claimed that it is in fact the current laws and practices that deny women the dignity 
given to them in shari’a.151 Zulficar explains that they needed to look for creative ways to 
diversify their approach by reaching out to ordinary religious men and women to get their 	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support.152 However, their efforts were often resisted by the oppressive measures of 
conservatives’ authoritarian and patriarchal attitudes, as well as the unsympathetic 
attitudes of many ordinary men.153 
 
D. RESISTANCE TO KHUL’ 
Opposition to khul’ came as no surprise but rather highlighted the strong resistance 
family law reform received, even when its in the language of Islam.154 Despite being 
supported by Al Azhar,155 and promoted by Islamic analysis to legitimize it, khul’ 
witnessed vehement rejection throughout political, legal and social circles.156 The 
resistance that khul’ faced was also manifested through hurdles set forth by the state to 
hinder women’s access to divorce. Although some of the arguments made against the law 
were based on religious, social and procedural grounds, the majority of the arguments 
made were “constructed along masculine perspectives and conservative interpretations of 
the shari’a.”157 
 
The idea that women could divorce at their own will, even without harm and without 
their husband’s consent was very controversial.158 It was this freedom that turned the 
hierarchal structure and model of marriage, jeopardizing the dictated gendered roles 
between husband and wife. Women’s freedom to end an unwanted marriage was 
translated by opponents into women wanting to leave their husbands for more attractive, 
richer men as Fawzy argues of claims made by the Wafd Party in Parliamentary debates 
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surrounding khul’.159 The obedience-maintenance relation between husband and wife was 
threatened as a result of khul’, underscoring the conservative interpretations of the law to 
fit patriarchal mindsets. 
 
Using a standard religious discourse may have been why reformers succeeded in passing 
khul’. However, they did not go far in dismantling sexist beliefs disguised as religious 
norms, which still managed to influence the outcome of the law through impediments 
mandated by Islamists and implemented by the state. 160 Instead of leading new reform, 
reformists found themselves restructuring past reforms and mending laws based on 
patriarchal perceptions of women. As we will see in the next sections, women are still 
marginalized and reforms have not succeeded in changing the hierarchal, gendered 
standard of marriage, which continues to live on through the ‘new’ laws. 
 
1. Debate surrounding khul’:   
Essam Fawzy,161 Hoda Zakariyya162, Jasmine Moussa163 and Nadia Sonneveld164 agree 
that the debate in parliament was far from dull. Based on these authors’ description of the 
parliamentary debates, many arguments made against the law were based on women’s 
rationality and concern over the stability of the family as well as the law’s conformity 
with shari’a. 
 
a. Stability of the family:  
One argument that is often seen in opposition analysis surrounding khul’ involves 
women’s rationality and stability of the family.165  
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Their portrayal of women presumes women constantly have bad intentions. Women are 
considered too emotional to have the right to unilateral divorce and that they would 
destroy their families for frivolous reasons through divorce.166 The idea that giving 
women the right to divorce would result in women immaturely abandoning their children 
for more attractive men was seen throughout analysis of parliamentary debates.167 It also 
portrays women as merely sexual beings, which is uneven logic as men are the ones that 
often marry more than one woman. The tone of the arguments regarding women’s ability 
to make adult decisions demonstrates the attachment to the patriarchal structure of male 
supremacy. It is as if women are no different from unruly children trying to manipulate 
their way into achieving immature and shortsighted goals. 
 
Furthermore, it is troublesome that these claims emphasize the belief that only female 
initiated divorces would ultimately destroy the family. They assume that it is entirely the 
woman’s responsibility to keep the family together, and if she were to seek a divorce, she 
would be abandoning her children based on petty reasons. It is striking that opponents 
who base their claims on the stability of the family and the children’s well being do not 
acknowledge the effects of male-initiated divorce in particular and actions in general on 
the family.  
 
b. Shari’a:   
Opponents treated khul’ law as if it were an innovation, despite being mentioned in the 
Qur’an and Sunna fourteen centuries ago.168  Some disparagements of khul’ were based 
on different interpretations of Shari’a, such as whether or not the husband’s consent is 
required for divorce to be granted. Zakariyya notes that even some “wise 
parliamentarians who had extensive knowledge of khul' in the shari’a, intervened in the 
debates to explain how making khul' contingent upon a husband’s approval violated the 
intent of khul'.”169 	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The resistance, anger and fear that judges, as well as members of parliament, exhibited in 
the debate surrounding Khul’ has as much to do with widespread societal restrictions and 
gendered roles as religion, per se.170 It was clear that not all claims against khul’ were 
genuinely religiously motivated, rather religion was used as a guise for preserving the 
traditional hierarchy between husband and wife and maintaining the status quo that 
opponents contended were sanctioned by Islam. Arguing against khul’ on the basis of 
shari’a was easily altered into a debate over defending Islam, rather than patriarchal 
interpretations, which opponents used to gain legitimacy and support. For example, 
Essam Fawzy notes that some members of parliament had to keep in mind upcoming 
elections and wanted to view themselves as the ones defending and preserving Islam to 
gain more political support.171 
 
Islamists’ strict interpretations of shari’a impeded reformists’ efforts to pass the law, 
ultimately challenging reformers to religious argument on the Islamicity of khul’. 
For example, anyone not in agreement with conservatives was often accused of being a 
Zionist agent, westernized and anti-Islamic.172 Opponents went as far as calling the 
sheikh of Al Azhar a non-believer, kafir173, for approving the new law. This would 
redirect and refocus the debate on Islam itself, rather than patriarchal interpretations from 
which this resistance stems.  
 
Some religious scholars, ulama, believed that the law went against men’s guardianship 
over women, qiwama.174 Asef Bayat argues that Islamists often use their interpretation of 
the Qur’an to defend misogyny, particularly the verse al-rejal qawwamoun ala-nisa 
(Nisa, 4:34).175 However, theologians determined that “the word qawam not to the Arabic 
root qym, meaning guardianship over other, but to qwm, signifying "rising up," "fulfilling 
needs," or ‘protecting,’” 176 and that the meaning did not give men the exclusive right to 
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divorce, nor did it deny women the right to divorce.177 The irony is that the verse that was 
often used to defend their paradigm can be used to break it apart. Interpreting the Qur’an 
and Hadith in ways to further Islamist’s ideology has been an effective tool for a long 
time. Unfortunately, women are often the ones who pay the price for this manipulation of 
religious texts, as their family rights are the ones at stake.  
 
Finally, as Moussa notes, claims against shari’a were harder to challenge in parliament 
and it was not until ijtīhad was introduced as a reform tool that the law passed and 
opponents were defeated.178 In 2002, the Supreme Constitutional Court reaffirmed that 
the khul’ law is in conformity with shari’a, which was a relief and victory for feminist 
activists.179 By resorting to the language of Islam and exercising ijtīhad, the Group of 
Seven, supported by other forces, managed to successfully reach legal reform. However, 
this is part of a wider struggle for social reform and gender equality. Patriarchal 
interpretations of the law, the confusion between patriarchal beliefs and religion, along 
with the social hierarchy between men and women significantly continue to undermine 
khul’ theoretical benefits. 
 
2. RESISTANCE IN THE MEDIA 
The media’s portrayal of women pursuing khul’ echoed society’s heavily patriarchal 
beliefs and perceptions of women. In the media, khul’ was treated not as giving women 
equal rights, but rather as an emasculating law, taking power away from the man and 
giving it to the woman.180 The campaign against khul’ was portrayed in newspaper 
headlines and caricatures that showed women with mustaches and pregnant men.181 It 
portrayed women as lewd and western like; wearing tight, revealing clothes, high heels 
and not wearing a veil, emphasizing the idea that khul’ is a western, untraditional and 
immoral notion. The way in which the women seeking khul’ were depicted echoed 
opponents’ agenda that the law would be abused by women who would manipulate their 	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husbands, that it was a western plot aimed at destroying the Egyptian family. Showing 
women as foreign was an attempt to gather support against khul’ by making it seem 
alien.182 The media’s portrayal of the law sent the message that the khul’ law would 
ultimately threaten the identity of Egyptian society.183 
 
E. GIVING IN TO ISLAMISTS’ PRESSURE  
The Egyptian government gave in to pressure from Islamists and made concessions to the 
khul’. The hurdles injected to the legal system were based on sexist and misogynist 
perceptions of women,184 and reinforced Islamists’ patriarchal views of women’s 
capability to make rational decisions. They reasserted the perception of women as 
second-class citizens, as these hurdles significantly impeded women’s access to divorce 
and undermined the theoretical benefits that khul’ came to offer. 
 
This leads one to question the purpose of legal reform when patriarchal views determined 
to maintain the gender hierarchy manages to resurface and reinvent themselves under 
new forms, directly affecting the effects of the law. Patriarchal beliefs have not subsided 
after the adoption of khul’, but were in fact reasserted by the legal, social and financial 
obstacles that women must endure. 
 
1. Revoking financial rights: 
Although the Maliki hadith that the Egyptian legislature adopted stated that Habība give 
back the garden that Thābit had given her as dowry185, the Egyptian version included 
paying back the dowry as well as renouncing all financial rights that women are usually 
entitled to at the time of divorce.186 As Amira Mashhour states “most of the classical 
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jurists adjudged that the wife should pay back her dowry, while the government version 
stipulated that women should revoke all their legitimate material rights.”187  
 
The idea that a woman must ‘ransom’ herself from an unwanted marriage and forfeit all 
legitimate financial rights “serves to both deter woman from ever seeking to divorce their 
husbands and make their lives miserable post-divorce.”188 Additionally fueling the sexist 
nature of the law, since a woman has to revoke all her financial rights as well as pay back 
the dowry, khul’ can be financially advantageous to men as men may refuse to initiate the 
divorce themselves to avoid expenses and get reimbursed, for example.189 This 
underscores the inequalities in women’s path to divorce. Even with a law that is supposed 
to enhance women’s rights, there are loopholes men may abuse. Conversely, threatening 
to revoke financial rights appeases opponents fears that women would use khul’ to 
manipulate their husbands for money. 
 
Some men dispute how much they pay at the time of marriage, delaying the process 
further. Judges go to great lengths to investigate and ensure that men get reimbursed 
exactly what they paid.190 Muntasir Ibrahim, an attorney at the Association for the 
Development and Enhancement of Women, a Non-Governmental Organization that 
provides legal and financial assistance to low-income female-headed households, 
explained to Human Rights Watch:  
They said it [khul`] would take six months maximum. Some cases we’ve seen 
have taken as long as three years even though the law itself was intended to 
shorten the process.…The problem is that the husband says that the dowry is more 
than what it is, what they agreed upon. The majority of people in Egypt of all 
classes put a token 1 Egyptian pound [$US 0.16] dowry [in the marriage 
contract]. The husband contests this amount and says that he paid more. The 
judge gives him time to get witnesses. But [then the judge is told that] the 
witnesses are sick. Other men say that the ayma [list of wife-owned household 
furniture signed by the husband before marriage] was actually the dowry. The 
process just keeps getting delayed. 191 
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The reality that marriage contracts do not reflect the true amount paid can delay the khul’ 
process, as husbands claim paying differing amounts.192 Judges determine how much a 
woman has to pay back to the husband, often giving men multiple opportunities to show 
they paid more than they did. Furthermore, according to a study done on family courts in 
Egypt,193 some women were “ordered by the judges to pay the deferred as well as the 
advance parts of the dower, although it was customary for wives to collect the deferred 
part of the dower at the time of divorce or the death of the husband.” 194 In other words, 
women were ordered to pay more than what they received from their husbands at the 
beginning of the marriage in exchange for her freedom. As far as men are concerned, 
judges are quite flexible, providing them with leeway and time to support payment 
claims. Also, women’s non-financial contributions to the household, including child 
bearing, are not taken into account. 
 
2. Mandatory reconciliation: 
In addition to renouncing all legitimate financial rights, the government also implemented 
mandatory reconciliation. The process should not exceed three months. If the couple have 
children, another three months must be completed, with a three month waiting period 
between attempts, before a khul’ can be finalized.195 The court assigns two arbiters, one 
of which is female, to mediate between the couple.196   
 
While a woman must go through multiple reconciliation attempts when she initiates a 
divorce, the same is not true for a man. In fact, men do not have to enter a courtroom 
when they initiate the divorce. The opponents to khul’ never question men’s 
unconditional right to divorce or the potential effects of men’s relatively easy divorce 
procedure on the stability of the family. A public prosecutor in Cairo told Human Rights 
Watch that mediation was necessary because “a woman may be hasty in filing for a 
divorce and may not have a strong keenness in keeping the family together. The court has 	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to play this role and intervene. Men are more wise and rationale than women. A woman’s 
emotions can overcome her rationality.”197 The one-sided reconciliation requirements 
reinforces Islamists’ suspicions that women are irrational, need time to get back to their 
senses, and cannot make such big decisions on their own. 
 
Women in abusive relationships are not exempt from mandatory reconciliation, as 
victims of domestic abuse must still go through the reconciliation period.198 This is 
another example of the effect of patriarchy on attempted reform, as this was not 
originally a part of khul’ but was added to placate Islamists. It is humbling for women 
and empowering for men without serving a practical purpose, reinforcing the inequality 
in the divorce system. 
 
Aside from the aforementioned constraints, women face social constraints as well. 
Arbiters are often inexperienced or have typical gendered views of women, pressuring 
women to accept conditions offered by the husband or persuading women to drop the 
case instead of trying to reconcile the couple.199 Judges and mediators warn women of the 
stigma and difficulties they will face as a result of the khul’, and that her daughters will 
have difficulty finding prospective suitors to marry.200 The question of why these 
limitations only apply to women reinforces the level of sexism involved in all aspects of 
the divorce process. This highlights how ingrained sexism is in social, legal and religious 
interpretations and implementations. As Mashhour explains, “when patriarchal culture 
dominates, conservative, literal, and selective interpretations of the text prevail, as in the 
case of khul’ in Egypt, which denies women some rights that were already granted in 
classical Islamic jurisprudence.”201 Mandatory reconciliation, which has no bases in 
shari’a and emphasizes opponents’ patriarchal beliefs that women are not keen on 
preserving their marriage, exemplifies this. 
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The effectiveness of mediation is very limited, since many women resort to khul’ after all 
other reconciliation efforts have been exhausted. Many judges agree that reconciliation is 
ultimately a mere formality and they are more concerned with having complete 
documents than what happens in the actual mediation sessions.202 This disingenuousness 
is demonstrated by the detail that even if the couple reaches an agreement through 
reconciliation, there is no follow up by the court. If the agreement falls through after the 
wife accepts going back to the husband, she would have to start the entire divorce process 
all over again, including undergoing another set of reconciliation attempts.203 Therefore, 
mandatory reconciliation acts as a stalling mechanism, providing obstacles for women 
considering divorce. The Egyptian government succumbed to Islamists’ concern that 
khul’ would empower women to divorce their husbands more freely.204 This also supports 
the belief that it was inserted to deter women from resorting to khul’ by making it a long 
and complex process. 
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IV. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN EGYPT 
The revived resistance to khul’ in particular and advancement of women’s rights in 
general in post revolutionary Egypt highlights the persistent patriarchy from which this 
opposition stems. No matter how often we change the legal code, whether the 
constitution or family law itself, sexist perceptions of women ingrained in our society 
manage to impede the law from advancing women’s status in society. 
 
 A. WOMEN’S ROLE IN THE REVOLUTION: 
 
The January 25th revolution brought about a sense of unity amongst Egyptians: young 
and old, men and women, Christians and Muslims alike. We saw men and women form 
human chains around the Egyptian museum to keep out looters and protect fellow 
Egyptians during prayers, directing traffic and guarding neighborhoods when the police 
forces disappeared. It was this sense of unity that made us believe that change will come 
for all. Women played a big role, as they stood shoulder to shoulder with men demanding 
justice for all in Tahrir square, the epicenter of the Egyptian revolution. They defied the 
stereotypes dictated by society and made their voices heard. They believed that the fall of 
Mubarak’s regime would bring down with it patriarchy and oppression and make way for 
equal rights and freedoms. This sense of optimism and unity quickly dissolved as 
Mubarak’s regime was brought to an end. Optimism for women’s advancement faded as 
sexist and stereotypical views of women from emerging Islamist groups that had been in 
the shadows for years, gained power. And the hopes of advancing women’s rights turned 
into hopes that the modest rights we have now remained, not be repealed and erase some 
of the progress that had been made over the years. 
 
B. ROLE OF STATE/ RISE OF ISLAMISTS 
 
At the time of adoption of khul’ in 2000, the Egyptian government’s response to 
conservatives’ demands underscored the middle of the road approach that it usually 
adopted in the pre-revolution period to appease both the religious conservatives and the 
international community which it depended on for much funding. However, this resulted 
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in an uneven divorce system where women are still marginalized despite these new 
reforms. By including mandatory reconciliation and revoking all financial rights, the 
government reinforced the subjugated perception of women irrational cannot be trusted to 
make such big decisions on their own. The government, therefore reasserted the dominant 
values of female oppression and male supremacy, which ultimately took away from the 
potential benefits of khul’. By backing Islamists’ fears, the government was looking out 
for its own interest in order to validate its own uncertain legitimacy. Sharabi argues that 
fundamentalists are “not only allowed to proclaim their doctrines freely and publicly but 
are often provided with substantial aid by the state institutional machinery and media. 
While the new radical critics are routinely attacked, muzzled and suppressed.”205 This 
was clear by the government’s concessions and the resistance in the media, which heavily 
criticized the law and those who labeled it as anti Islam, western and made by elites to 
emasculate men. 
 
Whereas before the revolution, the secular government adopted a piecemeal approach to 
deal with personal status reform and khul’ law in particular, the majority of Islamists in 
government right now may not be as inclined to appease both parties since they 
themselves share similar values as those who attack women’s rights and resist reform.  
Furthermore, while the Muslim Brotherhood is still concerned with appeasing the West, it 
is to a lesser extent than the Mubarak regime. Malika Zeghal notes that Islamists gain of 
power could have one of two possible outcomes. The first and more optimistic outcome 
views the participation of Islamists in free elections as a path to democratization, as they 
themselves become democrats just by participating regardless of their original 
commitments.206 The second account sees their participation and inclusion in the system 
“ending in the creation of an Islamist authoritarian regime by means of ‘one man, one 
vote, one time,’ with the Islamists’ lack of commitment to democracy being the most 
crucial factor explaining the type of polity that they will shape.”207 The second scenario is 
what many people are afraid of in Egypt, especially given Islamists actions during their 
first few months in control.  	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In contrast to before the revolution, when Islamists were in the shadows, they have now 
gained real power to implement their views. Islamists, as is the case with democracy, 
support political pluralism when it substantiates their agenda. 208  On the one hand, they 
claim democracy because that is how they won and that the principle of universal 
citizenship is necessary to vital to democracy. On the other hand, they are “divided about 
equality between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens and between men and women,”209 and 
are quick to criticize and punish those that disagree with them. 210 Differing opinions are 
brushed off as “anti-Islam” or “old regime”. They are for democracy when it is 
convenient and supports their goals. 211 
 
The political turmoil in the country post revolution has undoubtedly helped Islamists 
mobilize and gain support. While secularists seemed overwhelmed, divided, and out of 
touch with the masses, Islamists, by using religious texts as means of persuasion, are able 
to mobilize and persuade the people, especially in times of crises.212 Since they use Islam 
and shari’a to back their agendas rather than logic and debate, they become a stable 
formation that ordinary people yearn for at times of instability. In Hisham Sharabi’s 
words; 
Secular criticism’s fatal weakness lies in that, unlike fundamentalism, it is an avant-garde 
movement and out of touch with the masses. As such it finds itself at a double 
disadvantage: it enjoys limited power in the political arena (lacking political 
organization), and as state censorship erodes, restricts, and deflects its effectiveness, it 
finds itself also opposed by mass (religious) opinion. Fundamentalism, on the other hand, 
is able by means if it religious appeal to put the status quo on the defensive as well as 
mobilize the masses. But perhaps the greatest drawback the secular critics suffer stems 
from the fundamentalists’ refusal to engage in rational and open discussion. The latter’s 
approach is essentially one of persuasion or conversion rather than debate, reasoning or 
argument. Thus secular criticism is reduced to the status of the heretical or subversive 
discourse and the radical critics are pushed back to the position of defensive interlocutors 
who lacks legitimacy. It is fair perhaps to conclude that the moment fundamentalism 
gains power it will tend to rule out the possibility of any sort of dialogue. 213 
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The victory of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi came as a setback for 
many, especially feminist activists who knew, given the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
history,214 that women’s rights would be threatened. Islamists define women within a 
family and interpret texts in a way that favors men.215 After Morsi became president, 
there has been a clear polarization of power making it problematic for women’s rights, as 
reforms would be revised by an extension of the government itself with conservative 
views. 
 
The legal system has a great influence on limiting or allowing patriarchy to control 
women’s rights. By allowing patriarchal mentalities to interpret the laws and social roles, 
the government reinforces sexist beliefs and practices embedded in our society. In 
Valentine Moghadam’s words: 
Another critical factor in the persistence of patriarchy lies in state policy, including the 
legal system, which exerts a further influence on the persistence, modernization, or 
weakening of patriarchy and, by extension, on women and the family. It enjoins men to 
take responsibility for the support of their wives and children. In the Arab-Islamic family, 
the wife's main obligations are to maintain a home, care for her children, and obey her 
husband. He is entitled to exercise his marital authority by restraining his wife's 
movements and preventing her from showing herself in public. I have referred to this as 
the patriarchal gender contract, The patriarchal contract is realized within the family and 
codified by the state in the form of Muslim Family Law or the Personal Status Code.216 
 
Not surprisingly, the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power has also brought with it a new 
space to debate women’s rights within shari’a. Patriarchy, society, the law and religion 
are often too intertwined, as Islamists use that to their advantage in order to maintain the 
status quo restraining the rights of women that are actually awarded to them in shari’a.217 
Mino Moallem argues that “religion and culture are not only inseparable from each other, 
they cannot be divorced from the historical conditions in which they emerge; nor can they 	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be separated from the law, interpretations of the law, or an understanding of religion that 
accounts for sexualized bodies and desiring subjects.”218 The current patriarchal 
landscape in Egypt is ripe for the Brotherhood to influence the masses at the expense of 
women’s rights. 
 
In an effort to show that the government is indeed changing the old regime, instead of 
addressing key issues that have genuinely been affected as a result of the revolution, 
Islamists preferred to address unnecessary changes. Because they fail to understand the 
true principles of democracy,219 and have no experience in advancing a nation 
economically and socially, they use quick remedies to validate their legitimacy.220 For 
instance, threatening to repeal laws that have relatively benefited our society based on 




The political landscape is only moving further and further to the right since the revolution 
due to the Brotherhood’s stranglehold on power. However, the Brotherhood is relatively 
liberal compared to the Salafists. The ultra-conservative Salafists have an increasing 
influence based on fundamental interpretation of Islam. Salafists who did not have a 
voice under Mubarak, as they were silenced, now they have a voice portraying extreme 
ideals that are far from the beliefs of women’s rights reformists. For example, major 
affronts to women’s rights such as female genital mutilation and marriage to minors.221 
Salafists gained power and influence post-revolution and have attempted to curtail 
women’s rights based on their own rigid interpretation of Islam. The Salafist ideology is 
based in the return to al salaf al saleh, referring to the righteous, pure past “as lived by 
the Companions of the Prophet in the first three centuries of Islamic society”222 and 
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condemn other Islamist groups from deviating from this righteous path. 223 As potential 
allies, the Brotherhood does not want to alienate the Salafists, often attempting to appease 
them and turn them “into a reservoir of support for the [brotherhood’s] movement. In 
March 2011, the two groups co-led the campaign for the “yes” vote to approve proposed 
constitutional amendments. The fact that their camp received 77 percent of the vote was 
interpreted as a victory for both.”224 Any secular pressure is more than offset by the 
combination of Salafist pressure and Brotherhood power, resulting in a significant loss 
for women’s rights, even in comparison to Mubarak’s days in power. Salafists are a 
tremendous threat to reform and a danger to take women’s rights severely backwards. 
 
C. THE CONSTITUTION AND GENDER EQUALITY: 
The traditional equality approach used in constitutions is predominantly the same 
worldwide.225 The constitution in and of itself can do very little to help advance women’s 
position in society. The idea of treating unequals unequally (versus equals equally) fits 
the patriarchal structure ingrained in Egyptian society when it comes to men and women. 
The sexes are “kept pervasively unequal by social orderings,”226 confining women within 
socially accepted roles. This is not perceived as inequality because women were not seen 
as men’s full human equals. 227 
 
Catharine Mackinnon explains how being defined as different under the traditional 
equality approach can result in being treated unequally without that treatment being 
regarded as unequal. For example, when women are paid less for doing different work 
from men it is not seen as a problem of inequality, because even if it is of comparable 
value the work is different. 228 When reasonableness is established by mirroring society as 
it is, inequality is validated by an unequal status quo.229 Under this belief treating people 
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worse is seen to be reasonable and not subjective. 
 
The alternative view begins not with abstract views of equal and unequal, but with the 
question of whether an existing social hierarchy exists. Assuming that no social group is 
inferior to another, then social inequality occurs when members of society are treated 
unequally.230 A contradiction in the interpretation of women versus men is the thinking 
that they need to be protected for their differences on the one hand, but the reality of 
women being exploited and violated on the other. The same logic supports protecting 
women also supports contempt for them. The result has been the rationalization of social 
inferiority by terming it difference. Equality under the law has failed to deliver due to the 
social subordination of women that has been ingrained into society. This also justifies 
poor treatment of women by men, since it is practically sanctioned by the state.  
 
In order to improve their status, women need to look outside of formal equality that aims 
to treat likes alike, because men and woman are not perceived as equal. They are put on 
opposite ends of the social spectrum, so it should not be expected that they are treated the 
same. As Menon notes “society is steeped in patriarchal values and practices, the law and 
the state were seen as the only agents with the power and the legitimacy to bring about 
social transformation,”231 however the law is limited in ways to provide social equality 
through advancing legal rights. In order for the constitution and the law in general, to 
have an effective transformative ability in overcoming the patriarchal order, substantive 
equality measures must be reached. Social, political and economical hierarchal changes 
that recognize women as autonomous individuals and give them their own rights outside 
of men’s rights will allow women to improve their position in society that they hoped the 
revolution would bring. 
 
The status of women has taken a step back rather than forward in post revolutionary 
Egypt. Societal perceptions of women, the new constitution and the legal and physical 
attacks on women have proven to be a step backwards for female empowerment.  	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The constitutional committee assigned to draft a new constitution was not by any means 
representative of the Egyptian population; compromised of mostly men belonging to the 
Muslim Brotherhood while Christians and liberals resigned in protest. Women 
represented only seven percent of the constituent assembly designed to draft the new 
constitution and most of the members belonged to Islamist parties.232  
 
Presently, women are recognized in their own rights only as mothers and caregivers. For 
example, Article 10 of the Egyptian constitution underlines the role of women 
‘caregivers’ first and foremost.233 They may joggle their work at home with professional 
work, although no such obligations are imposed on men. This kind of thinking fuels 
societal perceptions of women as being defined only within a family, undermining their 
lives outside of the family as individuals. The constitution also fails to explicitly address 
discrimination on the basis of sex and stresses adherence to the principles of shari’a. 
Nehad Abul Komsan, director of the Egyptian Center for Women's Rights asks, who gets 
to define the principles of shari’a ? She notes “the same (Islamic) principles allow for 
women to be heads of states in Pakistan while banning them from driving in Saudi 
Arabia.”234  The constitution has perpetuated and supported women’s presumed gendered 
roles in society instead of minimize them.  
Although this was in the 1971 constitution, the Muslim Brotherhood’s policies are much 
more conservative than Sadat and Mubarak’s general attitudes towards personal status 
law reform. The Brotherhood being in power may very well exacerbate sexist 
presumptions under the guise of Islamic jurisprudence. 
 
Furthermore, there are no longer quotas in parliamentary elections. In parliament, women 
represented less than two percent, taking up only 11 of 805 seats. This is especially 
alarming, since even in Mubarak’s last parliament women had a quota of 64 seats.235  	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While adding articles that spell out women’s rights and protection in the constitution may 
spread awareness about gender equality, it is not enough and cannot be seen as an end 
result. Like Personal Status Law reform, it is only part of a wider struggle of advancing 
women’s rights in Egypt. 
 
 
D. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
  
Post revolution backlash to reform can be seen in Tahrir Square itself with the abuse of 
women that continues to take place. Ranging from catcalls to rape,236 women have been 
targeted by Islamists, police and sexist individuals in general. This can be linked directly 
to the current regime’s hostility towards women’s rights, even when compared to the 
challenges reform faced during the Mubarak regime. The Muslim Brotherhood is an 
organization dominated by men with traditional views regarding the role of women. The 
message that the new government has consistently sent, whether it is directly from 
President Morsi or from other members of his government, has been decidedly 
traditional. This does not escape the attention of Egypt’s citizens. Between government 
officials denouncing women on television and perpetrators not being held accountable for 
acts of violence against women, reform has taken a step backwards post-revolution. 
 
Further, the violence against women in the past two years has seen new highs. Women 
have blamed the rise of political Islam and Islamist elected officials who “have used their 
new positions to vent some of the most patriarchal impulses in Egypt’s traditional culture 
and a deep hostility to women’s participation in politics.”237  
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In fairness, it is important to point out that secular institutions like the military that 
graduated Mubarak and Sadat, who supported personal status law reform in the past, 
committed some of the crimes against women, like the forced virginity tests. However, 
reforming personal status laws and implementing them are two different things. Adopting 
khul’ has done little to change societal perceptions of women and the patriarchal 
mentalities of those in power, whether Muslim Brotherhood or military.  
 
Women in Tahrir have been systematically attacked in the months following the 
revolution. From gang rape to forced virginity tests performed by the military, sexual 
assault has become a part of the political struggle that women face in asking for equal 
rights.238  The violence can also be viewed as organized attacks against female protesters 
to intimidate and keep them out of the square in order to weaken their stance and silence 
their voices.  
 
A few months after the revolution a number of women got arrested, attacked and dragged 
to a military prison where they had virginity tests performed on them by a male military 
doctor while other military personnel watched. One of the girls sued the military, which 
vehemently denied the case. The military later admitted to having ordered it, stating that 
it was routine procedure because men and women had been camped out together in 
Tahrir. A general defended the tests saying that, “The girls who were detained were not 
like your daughter or mine. These were girls who had camped out in tents with male 
protesters in Tahrir Square, and we found in the tents Molotov cocktails and (drugs)."239 
The military doctor who performed these tests was acquitted.240 The way the government 
treated the virginity tests and other attacks epitomizes their stance when handling 
violence against women. Perpetrators are rarely punished for violence against women and 
many women do not report assault in fear that it will affect their reputation.241 Women 	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are often blamed and the perpetrators cleared. It is this notion of male supremacy and 
female subjugation that hinders the law from enhancing women’s status.  
 
 
E. SOCIETAL RESISTANCE 
 
In addition to the physical violence, women face a lot of social hurdles and stigma. Our 
society often blames female victims and not the perpetrators for sexual attacks.242. The 
idea that a woman “was asking for it” or brought it on to herself by dressing a certain way 
or being in the wrong place is unfortunately all too common. After the assaults in Tahrir, 
officials said that the victims “had invited the attacks” by participating in public 
protests.243 On the other hand, excuses are often made for men. By not explicitly 
addressing gender based violence in the constitution especially after the surge of violence 
against women in the past two years, the government is not doing enough to curb the 
violence at best and sending the message that it is acceptable at worst.  
 
This mentality of traditional roles limiting women’s options in society coincides with 
opposition to any kind of reform attempting to empower women. As Mayer argues 
women are often blamed for societal ills and are expected to preserve cultural values.244 It 
also highlights the lack of progress made in changing perceptions of women and the 
advancement of their position in society since khul’ was adopted in 2000. Even after a 
decade since the adoption of khul’, and a revolution based on equality, freedom and 
social justice, women are still treated as second-class citizens. The irony of the revolution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sexually assaulted at least six Egyptian and foreign women in Tahrir square. Although prosecutors 
investigated two of those incidents, they did not refer any cases to court in 2012, and overall the 
government failed to prioritize addressing violence against women.” 
242 Id, See for example, one of the women assaulted in Tahrir, “Hania Moheeb, 42, a journalist, was one of 
the first victims to speak out about her experience that day. In a television interview, she recounted how a 
group of men had surrounded her, stripped off her clothes and violated her for three quarters of an hour. 
The men all shouted that they were trying to rescue her, Ms. Moheeb recalled, and by the time an 
ambulance arrived she could no longer differentiate her assailants from defenders. To alleviate the social 
stigma usually attached to sexual assault victims in Egypt’s conservative culture, her husband appeared 
alongside her.  
243 El-Sheikh, supra note 238. 
244 Mayer, supra note 160 
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is that the current environment threatens to undo a century worth of personal status 
reform.  
 
F. LEGALITY OF KHUL’ IS UNDER CHALLENGE 
 
The rise of Islamists may have provided a space in which patriarchal mentalities can 
impose their conservative beliefs backed by selective interpretations of religious texts 
feeling that their ideals are widely supported. This is not solely an issue of Personal 
Status laws, but rather the new direction of which our country is headed. According to 
Mohamed Al Omda, a member of the Freedom and Justice party and former head of the 
constitutional and legislation affairs committee of Parliament, in multiple televised 
interviews, has claimed that he has proposed to repeal the khul’ law.245 He has gone on 
numerous talk shows to explain his position regarding the matter in an effort to influence 
public opinion. His claims stirred up much controversy and renewed a debate to overturn 
khul’ the likes of which has not been seen in over a decade. The arguments and 
justifications used by Omda, which echo Islamists’, have not changed since khul’ was 
first introduced. Confirming that even over a decade after legal reform and adoption of 
khul’, persistent patriarchal views manage to resurface and hinder women’s advancement 
in society. Omda’s arguments against khul’ centered around two themes: family stability, 
and association with the old regime.  
 
 
1. Stability of the family:  
Omda expressed great concern over women’s rights being defined outside the family and 
blamed women seeking a divorce through khul’ for not having an interest in keeping the 
family together.246 He directly ties women with children; stating that a woman is 
primarily a wife and a mother, she cannot have her own rights separate from her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Al Omda has appeared on a number of talk shows explaining his views on khul’ and his proposal to 
repeal it. This is the one I refer to in this thesis. The entire interview/debate is available at   
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0R41veQGeSE (accessed on April 6, 2013) 
246 Id.  
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children’s and her husband’s rights. 247  This epitomizes the sexist thinking that only 
female initiated divorce destabilizes the family and that women always have ulterior 
motives versus just trying to get out of an unwanted marriage. This mistrust of women 
and the belief that they would abandon their children at any moment not only is sexist but 
goes against the lived realities of many women seeking khul’. This is similar to the 
argument made pre-khul’ adoption in 2000, which seems to have gained some 
momentum after the revolution.  
 
In addition. Omda argues that women’s intentions must be investigated by a judge and 
then he will have the ultimate say. 248 However at no point did he mention the need for 
men’s motives for divorce be investigated under the same criteria. This ones sided type of 
argument is all too common when it comes to the patriarchal opposition’s point of view. 
Omda, and many like him, give men the benefit of the doubt while at the same time 
questioning women’s intentions. 
 
It has been over a decade since the implementation of khul’ and statistics have not 
supported the claim that women get divorced for petty reasons and abandon their 
children.249 The continued resistance to khul’ shows how much it threatens the status quo 
that Islamists want to preserve. 
 
2. Associating a law with the old regime: 
Another argument made in opposition to khul’ categorizes it as Suzanne’s laws or 
associates it with the old regime. After the revolution this argument became popular 
because of the disapproval of Mubarak’s regime. Omda, as well as other opponents of, 
explained that khul’ is a product of Suzanne Mubarak, who had direct relations with 
foreign organizations aimed at destroying the family and Islam.250  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 Id.  
248 Id.  
249 Id 
250 Id. 
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Associating the old regime with the law in order to mobilize people against it is not new 
in Egyptian history. Decree law 44/1979 faced the exact argument and was labeled 
Jihan’s law, which gained a lot of support against the law and was later annulled by the 
Supreme Constitutional Court. This strategy is used to make people who hate the 
Mubarak regime hate this law as well, regardless of whether or not it was a good law.  
It is fair to point out that even though Suzanne Mubarak is associated with the old 
regime, she did help pass a law that was in the making for years. Because of the 
understandable displeasure of the Mubarak regime, this argument may have some merit. 
However, we must first see if this law has benefited society before we can simply do 
away with it because it is simply associated with the old regime and throwing away a 
century’s worth of personal status law reform efforts. Using the Mubarak regime rhetoric 
is just another attempt to gather public opinion under the guise of revolutionary rhetoric 
in order to hinder women’s advancement in the area of personal status laws. How about 
all the other laws that were formulated under Mubarak, why are just Personal Status 
Laws being labeled as ‘old regime’?251 
 
Mulki Al Sharmani adds that Islamists invoking shari’a is not something new, what is 
new “is their being presented to the public as part of a revolutionary struggle against 
corruption and the political repression of the old regime.”252 These Islamists are looking 
to use whatever means they can to advance their agenda by attempting to use the post-
revolution political climate in their favor. For example, attaching old regime and 
Mubarak to issues are now as effective as criticizing the West or using the Qur’an to rally 
the masses. Opponents pointed to “old regime” to support certain positions, but ignore it 
if it contradicts their agenda. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 See Singerman, supra note 149, at 9; “Macroeconomic and social changes during the past decade in 
Egypt have shaken the foundations of the household, its norms, and its gendered division of labor, and 
radical Islamist activists have used the increasing economic, social, and moral predicaments of lower-
income communities as fodder for their opposition to the Mubarak regime and its allies in the West and the 
Middle East. Culture, values, norms, religion, and the structure of the family remain at the center of their 
counterhegemonic movements”  
252 Camilo Gómez-Rivas, Women, Shari‘a, and Personal Status Law Reform in Egypt after the Revolution, 
(Oct 1, 2011) http://www.mei.edu/content/women-shari‘-and-personal-status-law-reform-egypt-after-
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This leads to question whether people’s perceptions have changed in the past thirteen 
years, since the adoption of khul’. How can the law have a transformative power if 
thirteen years later societal perceptions remain unchanged? Furthermore, how about 
women with no children? How about divorce statistics in the past 10 years? 253  
How about male initiated divorces and their effect on the stability of the family? 
Women’s happiness contributes a great deal to the stability of the family love and mutual 
respect as well. 
 
G. OTHER FORMS OF RESISTANCE 
The attack on khul’ was a part of a series of proposals from Islamists to reform existing 
laws of personal status and women’s rights fueling controversy over Islamists attempts to 
curb women’s already limited rights.254  
 
The most recent hurdle in the advancement on women’s rights was Egypt’s resistance to 
the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women.255 This rejection based on 
women’s roles within society and the family exemplifies the ongoing resistance to 
women’s rights in post-revolution Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood gave many reasons 
why they reject the declaration. They believe that this declaration would destroy the 
cohesion of the Muslim family. They argued that this would “give girls sexual freedom, 
legalize abortion, provide teenagers with contraceptives, give equality to women in 
marriage and require men and women to share duties such as child care and chores. 
Egypt’s ruling Muslim Brotherhood warns that a United Nations declaration on women’s 
rights could destroy society by allowing a woman to travel, work and use contraception 
without her husband’s approval and letting her control family spending.”256  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 According to Nehad Abul Komsan, The National Council for women, the Ministry of Justice announced 
that only 3 percent of divorce cases are through khul’ and 97 percent is fault based.  
http://www.ncwegypt.com/index.php/ar/2013-03-06-10-17-18/factsara 
254 HUMAN WATCH WORLD REPORT, supra note 199, at 530 
255 The text of the Declaration of the Elimination and Prevention of all Forms of Violence Against Women 
and Girls, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw57/CSW57_Draft_AC_proposal_presented_by_CSW_Burea
u_8_February_2013.pdf 
256 see supra note 258, see also Patrick Kingsley, Muslim Brotherhood Backlash Against UN Declaration 
on Women’s Rights, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 15, 2013, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/15/muslim-
brotherhood-backlash-un-womens-rights.  
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The National Council for Women released a statement in response to the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s rejection on proposed draft stating: 
The claim that the proposed document contradicts Islamic Sharia Law and its 
principles, destroys and demolishes Islamic manners, and destroys ruins the 
family institution is completely false. This claim is deceiving, misleading, and 
constitutes a misuse of religion, in an attempt to destroy the image of the United 
Nations, in order to prevent preclude and all women’s rights for women. 
Moreover, the ten points of the MB’s statement on the subject completely lacks 
any element of truth. The proposed document did not mention anything about 
inheritance, divorce, guardianship, or any permission granted to Muslim women 
to marry non- Muslims, or sexual freedom for the girl child, or granting 
homosexuals all rights.257 
 
Their quick response to attack the draft without even reading it closely shows the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s avoidance of even having a dialogue where women’s rights are discussed. 
Time and time again, Islamists use interpretations of Islam favorable towards their 
agenda in order to justify attempts to suppress women’s rights and maintain the hierarchy 
between men and women. Although using Islam to avoid abiding by women’s rights’ 
conventions is not new to Egypt, the new constitution demonstrates that the new 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 The National Council for Women’s response to the Muslim Brotherhood’s statement on the proposed 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
After examining the resistance to khul’ law of 2000, the environment for women in the 
post revolution era remains hostile, further reinforcing societal perceptions and 
patriarchal order under the guise of Islam. This highlights that women’s position in 
society has not changed enough for the better. However, even though the role of khul’ in 
advancing women’s rights has been limited, it has offered a remedy for those who did not 
have a choice before and has increased awareness towards women’s rights. Repealing it 
would be a major step backwards for the future of women’s rights and would throw away 
a century worth of legal reform efforts. 
 
Legal reform must be part of a wider effort against Egypt’s patriarchal culture in order to 
improve the status of women in society. Women seeking divorce who understandably do 
not trust the system may be inclined to resort to other options to escape a bad marriage. 
The system’s negative impact on women trickles down to the children and family as a 
whole. On the other hand, human nature implies that men going into a marriage knowing 
they have easy options to get out of it, if things don’t work out to their liking, may not be 
as motivated to make it work. Unconditional power for men to divorce destabilizes the 
family no less than female initiated separations. What is more, if the limited options 
available through khul’ were repealed, increasing the level of difficulty for women to 
divorce, this could have a dissuading effect on the next generation of women considering 
marriage. In addition to fewer marriages, unregistered urfi marriages could arise due to 
the hardships women face from traditional, fault based divorce. 
 
Little progress is still better than no progress or regression, as khul’ has benefited women 
as a whole and given them more rights. Prior to its adoption women had to resort to the 
traditional divorce system that left them in limbo and in the hands of the courts for years.  
Nevertheless, the legal benefits of khul’ have been less than ideal due to implementation 
flaws. State imposed hurdles strengthened ingrained sexist mentalities and was often 
defended through the cloak of shari’a interpretations.  
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Post revolution, the current political environment has only strengthened Islamists ability 
to express and execute their extreme patriarchal beliefs when it comes to the role and 
rights of women. Women’s rights have taken a step back in the short term under 
Mohamed Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood government, but the fight to retain khul’ is 
essential for long term gains. Maintaining khul’, despite the renewed public opinion 
campaign against women’s rights under the new predominantly Islamic government, 
would be a significant victory demonstrating the resolve and resiliency of reformists. 
Maintaining past achievements coupled with small steps is crucial in reforming the 
patriarchal structure of Egyptian society. I believe that Islamists will continue to use their 
means to mobilize the country against reform. While they continue working to 
perpetually curb women’s rights and sustain the authority of men, reformists must 
persevere. 
